SF 298 Abstract continued fatalities, and 39% involved fatalities and/or injuries. The total number of RW SD-related accidents with fatalities represents 31% of the total helicopter accidents with fatalities for the 10-yr period. This review of accident data confirms that SD remains a substantial issue for the Army aviation community and reinforces the importance and relevance of SD awareness, research, education, and training in RW operations. D ESPITE THE EXTRAORDINARY rate of technological advances in aviation-related sciences and aircraft vehicle development over the past 100 yr, the human pilot ostensibly remains version 1.0, evolved for a terrestrial life at 1 G directed toward the Earth ' s center. A pilot ' s ability to accurately perceive his orientation and movement in space with respect to the Earth is essential for effective piloting and safe aircraft operation, yet we are in many ways poorly physiologically equipped to deal with the dynamic fl ight environment. As a result, spatial disorientation (SD) has plagued aviation since its inception, contributing to numerous lost lives, destroyed or damaged aircraft, and a reduction in operational mission effectiveness. Indeed, almost 100 yr ago, Royal Navy Surgeon-Lieutenant H. Graeme Anderson ( 1 ) astutely noted that " … a sound equilibrium and muscle sense is essential in fl ying, so that the aviator would be conscious of his position in space, realize at once any deviations therefrom, and correct these quickly. But in fog it has been found almost impossible to detect any deviation during a fl ight. Time and again aviators coming out of dark clouds or fog have found themselves fl ying one wing down, and it has been recorded that some have fl own upside down without knowing it " (p. 33).
Parmet and Ercoline ( 22 ) defi ne SD as " a state characterized by an erroneous orientational percept, that is, an erroneous sense of one ' s position and motion relative to the plane of the Earth ' s surface " (p. 181). Despite decades of awareness to this killer within the aviation community, SD-related accident rates have not declined substantially over the years, contributing to approximately one-third of all mishaps ( 16 ) . SD accidents are particularly unforgiving, with very high rates of pilot and crew fatalities in both the military and general aviation arenas ( 16 , 20 , 23 ) .
The U.S. Army ( 11 ) defi nes spatial disorientation as " an individual ' s inability to determine his or her position, attitude, and motion relative to the Earth ' s surface " (p. 9-1). There have been previous major reviews of U.S. Army rotary-wing (RW) mishaps with respect to SD with varying results and confounding comparisons by differing defi nitions, predominant aircraft of the time, and changes over time in training, tactics, and technology [e.g., night vision goggles (NVG) and forward looking infrared (FLIR) night vision systems]. Ogden and colleagues ( 21 ) provided one of the fi rst looks (1957 to 1963) at Army helicopter " orientation error " (OE), reporting that it accounted for only 3.4% of major accidents, but 30.7% of all accident fatalities. Hixson and Spezia ( 17 ) reported over a 5-yr period (1967 to 1971) that OE accounted for 7.4% of total accidents and 16.5% of the total number of fatal accidents. Vyrnwy-Jones ( 25 ) analyzed data from U.S. Army helicopter SD accidents from 1980 to 1987, reporting , 1% of accidents attributable to OE, but responsible for one-quarter of severe accidents (Class A and B) and 14.8% of fatalities. In 1995, ARMY SD ACCIDENTS -GAYDOS ET AL.
Durnford and colleagues ( 13 ) determined that 32% of accidents from 1987 to 1992 were considered to have involved SD. In this case, the authors particularly noted the high SD accident risk of fl ying at night and with night vision systems. Braithwaite and colleagues ( 4 , 6 ) extended this work to include the years 1993 to 1995, confi rming that approximately 30% of accidents had SD as a major or contributing factor.
To adduce further evidence of the impact of SD on RW accidents, in the 1987 to 1995 data sets, SD-related mishaps constituted a larger percentage of Class A accidents, had higher average cost associated per accident, and resulted in more total lives lost and average lives lost per accident than non-SD-related accidents ( 6 ) . Since the previous reviews, the Army has retired many " legacy aircraft " represented in older studies, developed new training regimens for aircrew, continued to expand its night vision capabilities, and has prosecuted combat operations for some 10 yr exploiting new tactics, techniques, and procedures. For these reasons, it is important and relevant to re-engage the subject of SD among accidents within the Army ' s RW community.
METHODS
The U.S. Army ' s Combat Readiness/Safety Center database at Fort Rucker, AL, was queried for the previous 10 yr helicopter mishaps from fi scal year (FY) 2002 through FY 2011 (FY 11 data current through 01 July). Each FY included the period from 01 October of the previous calendar year through 30 September of that calendar year. RW mishaps implicating SD as a contributing factor were selected as cases for analysis. Cases were identifi ed as codifi ed by the Combat Readiness/Safety Center based on the Army defi nition.
U.S. Army schema for accident classifi cation is listed in Table I . Accident data do not include mishaps secondary to combat or hostile action. Combat or hostile action includes: enemy action, evasive action taken to avoid enemy fi re, or losses when returning from a combat mission when the last known position was in or over enemy territory ( 12 ) . Accident classes A through C were included in the review and analysis.
RESULTS
For FY 2002 to FY 2011 (inclusive to 01 July 2011), there were 100 Class A through C rotary-wing fl ight mishaps involving SD. This represents 11% of all Class A through C rotary-wing fl ight accidents for this period. Of the 100 SD-related accidents, 22% involved fatalities and 39% involved fatalities and/or injuries. The total number of rotary-wing SD-related accidents with fatalities represents 31% of the total helicopter accidents with fatalities for the 10-yr period. SD-related mishaps were more likely to result in a fatality (X 2 5 29.24, P , 0.0001) with a risk ratio (RR) of 3.6. In almost half of the cases (44%), there was a total loss of aircraft. Further characteristics of related factors in SD-related Class A through C accidents are presented in Table II .
Numbers of SD accidents by year and by airframe are refl ected in Figs. 1 and 2 . Total and SD-related RW mishap rates per 100,000 fl ying hours are shown in Fig. 3 , with an average rate of 9.76 for all accidents and 1.06 for SD-related accidents. The Army ' s current main operational helicopter force is largely comprised of four airframes: UH/MH-60, CH/MH-47, OH-58D, and AH-64. SD-related mishap rates per 100,000 fl ying hours per airframe per year for these four airframes are refl ected in 
Classifi cation Description
A The resulting total cost of property damage is $2 million or more; an Army aircraft is destroyed, missing, or abandoned; or an injury and/or occupational illness results in a fatality or permanent total disability.
B
The resulting total cost of property damage is $500,000 or more, but less than $2 million; an injury and/or occupational illness results in permanent partial disability, or when three or more personnel are hospitalized as in-patients as the result of a single occurrence.
C
The resulting total cost of property damage is $50,000 or more, but less than $500,000; a nonfatal injury or occupational illness that causes 1 or more days away from work or training beyond the day or shift on which it occurred or disability at any time (that does not meet the defi nition of Class A or B and is a day(s) away from work case). D *
The resulting in total cost of property damage is $2000 or more, but less than $50,000; a nonfatal injury or illness resulting in restricted work, transfer to another job, or medical treatment greater than fi rst aid. E * The resulting total cost of property damage is less than $2000. F * Incidents are confi ned to aircraft turbine engine damage because of unavoidable internal or external foreign object damage, where that is the only damage.
* Excluded from analysis.
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period under review, FY 2003 had the highest number of SD-related mishaps ( Fig. 1 ) , while the UH/MH-60 had the most number by aircraft type ( Fig. 2 ) . However, disproportionate numbers of hours fl own per year and by airframe affect risk exposure so that more accurate comparisons by year and by airframe should be made upon rates ( Figs. 3 and 4 ) . SD contributed to, on average, 10 mishaps per year at a rate of 1.1 per 100,000 fl ying hours for all RW aircraft and 1.4 for main operational aircraft ( Fig. 5 ) . SD was implicated in 11% of U.S. Army RW accidents reviewed. Although this is lower than the 30 to 32% reported for the previous decade ( 4 , 6 , 13 ), some points are noteworthy. Caution should be exercised with direct comparison of previous reviews with respect to confounding issues of case defi nition and selection, predominant airframes used during the period under review, and changes in training, tactics, techniques, and procedures that evolved over 10 years of war. The issue of case selection is worthy of specifi c mention. In previous reviews, all mishaps were reviewed by experienced aeromedical specialists with cases implicating SD selected with a high degree of interrater reliability. In the present study, cases were selected as codifi ed by the Combat Readiness/Safety Center. Depending on the mishap specifi cs, not every aviation Class A-C mishap is required to have a fl ight surgeon as a member of the investigating board ( 12 ) and investigating offi cials may have varying levels of related expertise in recognizing SD as a contributing factor to the mishap. Despite reports that overall rates of SD-related mishaps are not decreasing ( 2 , 9 , 16 ) , the data for this period under review do refl ect a decreasing accident rate from a high of almost three per 100,000 h in 2003 to lows of less than one from 2006 onward. This may represent a combination of two infl uential effects: high rates in the early years of combat theater fl ying and a decline through subsequent successful implementation of SDmitigation strategies. There has, in fact, been a concerted effort within the military RW community since the previous U.S. Army SD-related mishap reviews that has included triservice and multinational symposia and working groups ( 2 , 3 , 5 ), research and training developments ( 7 , 15 , 19 ) , and technology initiatives ( 2 , 23 , 24 ) to address the problem. Clearly, there is more work to be done. It is known that SD-related mishaps often carry a disproportionately higher penalty with respect to severity when compared to non-SD accidents. These data also reinforce this signifi cance and gravity, whereby SDrelated mishaps were more likely to result in a fatality, with a RR of 3.6. In addition to almost one-quarter (22%) of SD cases reviewed resulting in fatalities, this is further evidenced by more than one-third (39%) causing fatalities and/or injuries and almost one-half (44%) resulting in total destruction of the airframe.
Furthermore, there is argument that the actual number of SD-related accidents is probably higher than what is truly captured in mishap databases ( 5 , 14 , 16 ) with issues of inaccurate and under-reporting of SD in accident investigations. Gibb and colleagues ( 16 ) cite issues of misapplication of the defi nition (e.g., " too vestibularcentric " ), restrictive classifi cation taxonomies and coding, the fl eeting and transitory nature of important SD-related information, and resistance to cite contributing human factors in accident reports (p. 718 -719). Considering the extent of the problem, it is also important to note that, as previously reported ( 2 , 6 , 19 ) , the " operational ARMY SD ACCIDENTS -GAYDOS ET AL.
penalty " of SD is not solely limited to losses -few episodes of SD actually result in a mishap. SD-related accident rates imply a much greater impact on crew operational effectiveness due to a signifi cant number of " SD incidents " not captured in accident data. An illustrative quote was delivered at the fi rst Triservice Symposium on Spatial Disorientation in Rotary-Wing Operations ( 5 ): " Just because we ' ve not crashed more aircraft is not a reason to disregard SD ' s importance " (p. 30). These data do not refl ect reduced crew effi ciency, altered missions, or degraded effectiveness from SD-related " near misses. " The U.S. Army has prosecuted 10 yr of combat operations during the timeframe included in this review. The fact that helicopter SD-related losses are likely to be higher under wartime conditions has been described previously ( 5 , 8 , 10 ) . Case in point is the SD-related mishap peak of FY 2003, coinciding with the commencement of Operation Iraqi Freedom. This likely represents ill-preparation for diffi cult sand and dust conditions, with the overwhelming majority of SD-related mishaps reviewed from early in that theater involving brownout. The subsequent decline was multifactorial and can be attributed to command redress, more aggressive and extensive training prior to movement into theater, accumulation of aviator experience, and improved landing surfaces (e.g., forward arming and refueling points) as the theater matured.
Many conditions common to combat fl ight operations for the modern RW military aviator can contribute to SD: task saturation, high workload, cockpit distractions, complex and dynamically evolving missions, stress and anxiety, fatigue, unexpected or deteriorating weather conditions, unusual landing environs, night operations, prevalent employment of night vision systems, and others. These data have borne this out with nearly twothirds (62%) of SD-related helicopter mishaps resultant from combat theaters (not including enemy action or evasive action taken to avoid enemy fi re), more than half (58%) from multiship missions, two-thirds (66%) at night, and close to half (43%) involving brownout (all but two occurring in combat theater).
The association of advanced technology with SD has been described previously ( 16 , 18 , 24 ) . Night vision systems provide a poignant example of technological advances increasing the SD risk. While bringing a potent 
fl ight and operational capability, NVGs or integrated pilot night vision systems subsume numerous potential contributors to SD: poor contrast, reduced visual acuity, limited fi eld of view, reduced depth cues, increased workload, fatigue, and others. This is likewise refl ected in these data with two-thirds (65%) of SD-related helicopter mishaps employing a night vision aid at the time.
Commanders, safety offi cers, fl ight surgeons, and aircrew must maintain a healthy respect of, and vigilant posture toward, SD -both in training and especially in combat theaters. It degrades operational effectiveness and remains not only a signifi cant contributor to mishaps, but also a disproportionate player in serious accidents with fatalities and airframe destruction. SD represents an enduring and substantial risk to safe helicopter operations. The myriad challenges facing aviation leaders and commanders include preservation of combat capability and force protection, including the problem of SD. Addressing this issue has generally included the areas of awareness, research, education and training, and technological initiatives. A thorough treatment of this subject is beyond the scope of this discussion. Worth mention, however, is that addressing the problem necessitates the allocation of time, resources, and fundingnot unlimited commodities in a milieu of competing priorities and fi scal constraint. Technological initiatives that have received attention include vibrotactile cueing, novel symbology, three-dimensional audio, enhanced night vision systems, auto-recovery systems, and others. Many of these show great promise for certain types of SD-related errors. Caution should be exercised with viewing technology as a panacea, however, with concern 
that we are simply shifting the over-tasked pilot ' s fundamental SD-related errors to other categorizations. Awareness has historically fl uctuated, often rising to heights during periods marked by losses. SD-related cognizance and emphasis must be included not only in the syllabus of the pilot in training, but should permeate beyond the cockpit into courses for precommand and tactical planning.
Also worth mention is that some solutions may not represent a (comparatively) signifi cant devotion of funding and resources. Braithwaite ( 5 ) concluded that " the ' typical ' picture of rotary-wing SD is less one of a classical vestibular or visual illusion giving the pilot vertigo, but more one of hard-pressed aircrew fl ying a systems intensive aircraft using NVDs failing to detect a dangerous fl ight path " (p. 22). Certainly most, if not all, accidents are multifactorial in etiology, yet often accident board investigations include recommendations well within reach: better allocation of duties among crew, improve crew coordination, fatigue management, refi ne scan technique, review aeromedical aspects, and promote awareness of risk, as examples. To the extent that these can be addressed through training, as well as how best training should be implemented, is a matter of some dispute, but there has been signifi cant work done to advance the topics of education and training ( 2 , 3 , 23 ) . Triservice, interagency, and multinational work within the fold of training must continue and should include regular symposia reviewing, contrasting, and comparing ground-and fl ight-based demonstrations, frequency of instruction and requirement of refresher training, as well as audits and validation of effectiveness. Mission, roles, and aircraft differ, but similarities of some airframes and prevalence of common SD-related fl ight situations and subsequent errors permit exchange of evidence-based knowledge, best practices, and most effective techniques. It is unlikely that resources will permit attack of the problem on all fronts to consummation. Yet this should not preclude the implementation of some solutions where possible. Some may be relatively easier or fi scally permissible to implement and, where it can help, should be readily applied.
The human pilot will likely never be invulnerable to SD. These data represent a favorable decline in SDrelated RW mishaps both from the previous decade and during the decade under review with successful SDmitigation strategies worthy of further investigation. However, this study also confi rms that SD remains a substantial issue for the Army RW community and reinforces that SD-related accidents represent disproportionate mishap severity.
